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An inference task in one in which some known set of information is used to
produce an estimate about an unknown quantity. Existing theories of how humans
make inferences include specialized heuristics that allow people to make these infer-
ences in familiar environments quickly and without unnecessarily complex computa-
tion. Specialized heuristic processing may be unnecessary, however; other research
suggests that the same patterns in judgment can be explained by existing patterns
in encoding and retrieving memories. This dissertation compares and attempts
to reconcile three alternate explanations of human inference. After justifying three
hierarchical Bayesian version of existing inference models, the three models are com-
pared on simulated, observed, and experimental data. The results suggest that the
three models capture different patterns in human behavior but, based on posterior
prediction using laboratory data, potentially ignore important determinants of the
decision process.
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An inference task in one in which some known set of information is used to
produce an estimate about an unknown quantity. People make inferences all the
time: Any judgment based on indirect information about an outcome requires an
inference. Inferences guide important decisions. Which stock is more likely to in-
crease? Which applicant is more likely to improve a business? Better understanding
of inferences would allow us to influence and improve such decisions. Psychologists
have been interested in this problem for many years. The most recent resurgence
in interest, motivated by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996), had garnered over 2,400
citations at the time of writing. One important concept from Gigerenzer and Gold-
stein (1996) is that people use only a subset of the available information when
making an inference. Despite the volume of intervening research, the field is still in
disagreement over the precise process used to select the information used in a given
inference. This dissertation compares three hierarchical Bayesian implementations
of existing models of inference. Comparing these three models gives insight into the
problem of selecting information, both by demonstrating the effect this has on the
ultimate inferences and by illuminating the differences between existing theories.
One of the first models designed to account for how people make inferences of
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the type described above was the lens model proposed by Brunswik (1952, 1955).
In the lens model, knowledge about a judgment is encoded as a set of discrete cues.
To make an inference, relevant cues are weighted by importance and combined, akin
predictions with a linear model. Figure 1.1 illustrates the lens model. The distal
variable on the left is the quantity that a person intends to predict. The distal vari-
able is unknown by the decision maker, who instead has access to information about
the distal variable via proximal-peripheral cues. These cues are in turn related to
the distal variable by ecological validities, correlations between cues values and the
distal variable. While rational decision makers would combine the cues according
to their ecological validities to form a central response (i.e., make an inference),
individuals are not always perfectly calibrated to a given environment. People com-
bine the cues according to utilization weights, simultaneously bringing all available
information to bear on a particular inference. Correspondence between inferences
and the environment is indexed by the functional validity. Distal variables are not
necessarily determined by cues, so even perfect cue utilization could lead to decision
errors.
As an example, imagine a person is asked to choose which of two doctoral
students is more likely to graduate. Probability of graduation is an unknown quan-
tity, but is likely related to some observable, intermediate information like number
of publications, grade point average, and the advisor’s number of previously grad-
uated students. Assuming the person in question uses the lens model, he or she
would combine these pieces of information about each student, weight them accord-
ing to their utilization weights, and claim the higher weighted sum (Student B) has
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a higher probability of graduating (Table 1.1).
Cue
Student Publications GPA Advisor Weighted Sum
A 5 3.2 5 4.5
B 4 4.0 10 5.2
Weight .5 .3 .2
Table 1.1: Two fictional students and predictors of their probability of graduation.
One limitation of the lens model is that it does not accommodate information
processing constraints imposed on the decision maker. For example, in many real
world decision tasks, the decision maker is required to retrieve decision relevant
information from memory. The output of this memory retrieval process, and the
inherent limitations of working memory, therefore constrain what information a
decision maker brings to bear on any particular decision.
Figure 1.1: The lens model, from Brunswik (1952).
The lens model is just one of many weighted adding (WADD) models of infer-
ence (Anderson, 1990; Hammond, 1990). The class of weighted adding models all
assume that cue values are multiplied by some set of values and summed to produce
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an estimate of the judged outcome but differ primarily in the way cue weights are
calculated. This view of cognition is prevalent even outside of psychology, (Yoon
and Hwang, 1995; McCloskey, 1998). Meehl (1954) showed that perfect application
of the weighted sums of cues, calculated by regressing a distal variable on relevant
predictors, out-performs human clinical judgments. Many follow-up studies demon-
strate that a variety of factors, including the type of environment, the availability
of feedback, and the time spent learning, can affect the application of accurate cue
weights (Karelaia and Hogarth, 2008).
One major limitation with this class of models is the computational demand
placed on the individual. Cognitive demands for WADD models include: the needs
to retrieve information about the decision environment from memory with very high
accuracy (Gigerenzer et al., 1991), the need to compute cue validities (Dougherty
et al., 2008), and the need to aggregate information across multiple cues (Newell,
2005). People also operate under scarcity, both of the time they have to gather infor-
mation and of the resources available to remember and process information relevant
to a decision. Though regression weights are the informationally optimal way to
aggregate information in WADD, it may require substantial cognitive processing to
calculate regression-equivalent weights (though see Chater et al., 2003). Alternative
models reduce the computational burden of calculating and combining cue weights.
Dawes (1979) showed that even improperly specified linear models, which preserve
the valence of cue weights but mis-specify the exact weight, perform better than
human judges. While improper linear models reduce the computational burden of
cue weight generation, they still entail exhaustive search of relevant information.
4
The exhaustive search process on its own may exceed human cognitive capacity.
Herbert Simon argued that rationality for an actor with limited resources is
bounded rather than absolute (Simon, 1955). A decision maker will always have
competing goals. At some point the cost of increasing predictive accuracy relative
to one goal will interfere with a competing goal. Imagine buying a car, which is a
large investment and important to many people for a variety of reasons. Though
finding an optimal car is important, finite time can be spent researching different
makes and models of car, to say nothing of locating a specific, desired car that
is available for purchase. Instead, Simon’s bounded rationality suggests that a
buyer will find a car that meets his or her needs well enough while also limiting
the time spent researching and locating a car. Since then, a plethora of research
shows that people do fail to maximize the single goal of accuracy or utility. In
the laboratory, participants satisfice rather than maximize expected returns when
buying information in an incentive-compatible economic decision task, (Bowen and
Qiu, 1992; Fellner et al., 2009). These effects are reflected in affective responses to
decisions. Self-reported maximizers, compared with satisficers, have more regret and
are less satisfied with economic game outcomes (Schwartz et al., 2002); maximizers
also report worse life outcomes than satisficers, (Parker et al., 2007). People seem to
make social judgment based on heuristics, (Rand et al., 2014), which are satisficed
equivalents of moral rules, (Gigerenzer, 2010). Computer simulations show that
satisficing can lead to good performance in economics games, (Stirling and Goodrich,
1999).
The concept of bounded rationality has been applied to models of inference.
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Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) proposed that people have a toolbox of fast and
frugal heuristics that are adapted to different decision environments. Their theory
reconciles the concepts of bounded rationality, (Simon, 1955), and ecological valid-
ity, (Brunswik, 1955), by assuming that people match their computationally efficient
heuristics to the current decision environment, (Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Payne et al.,
1988, 1992). According to this theory, individuals select among available decision
heuristics and apply one that fits the inferential environment while minimizing cog-
nitive demands when confronted with the need to make an inference. Perhaps the
most widely studied among these fast and frugal heuristics is take-the-best (TTB).
Take-the-best begins with a structure similar to the lens model. Information
relevant to an inference is organized into discrete cues. TTB differs from earlier
rational models at this point, however; the cues are then ordered by cue validity
(CV) rather than combined to produce a central response. Instead of bringing all
information to bear on a given problem, TTB searches sequentially through cues
and makes an inference on the first discriminating cue. For example, the earlier
inference about which student has a higher chance of graduating can be made with
TTB. Assuming the weights are CVs, TTB starts with the most valid cue (number
of publications) and compares the values for each alternative. In this example,
Student A has published more papers, so TTB would infer that Student A is more
likely to graduate than Student B. TTB is frugal relative to WADD because it can
potentially ignore most of the relevant cues. Only when alternatives are tied on the
first cue will TTB utilize additional information. If both students had published the
same number of papers, TTB would look to see whether one had a higher GPA.
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While other cue quality metrics could be used to order cues, the most com-
monly assumed method of cue ordering is to search through cues based on CV. CV
is the probability that an alternative has a higher criterion value given that it also
has a higher cue value (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996), and contrasted with dis-
crimination rate (DR), the probability that two objects will have unequal criterion
values given that they have unequal cue values.
CV = p(A > B|cueA > cueB) (1.1)
DR = p(A 6= B|cueA 6= cueB) (1.2)
CV is practically bound between 0.5 and 1, since cues with CV of less than 0.5 are
reverse-coded. In our graduating student example, if advisor’s number of previous
students had a CV of greater than 0.5, the reciprocal would have a CV of less than
0.5, indicating that among pairs of students, the one with an advisor who advised
fewer students is more likely to graduate. DR gives the probability that a cue
could be used to discriminate between two alternatives. DR does not specify that
an alternative will have a higher criterion value contingent on cue value, only the
probability that a cue/criterion pair are not tied. For the dichotomous cue values
assumed in TTB, DR is bound between 0 and 0.5 and is negatively correlated with
CV.
Many factors influence the application of TTB and other one-reason decision
making algorithms. Martignon and Hoffrage (1999) show that a non-compensatory
environmental structure allows TTB to approximate the accuracy of WADD despite
purportedly requiring fewer computational resources. Ordered search produces mod-
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els that are non-compensatory; no combination of later cues can compensate for the
decision implied by an earlier discriminating cue. Consequently, ordered search
models work particularly well in environments where potential cues are highly cor-
related or where one strong cue overwhelms the explanatory power of other cues
(Lee and Zhang, 2012; Todd and Dieckmann, 2004). Thus, TTB performs best in
environments where the first cue is most important, either because it explains more
variance in the criterion than any combination of the following cues or because it
partially encodes the same information as other cues. Empirical evidence shows ad-
ditional constraints on decision heuristic use. Participants in a laboratory task are
more likely to use TTB when additional information is costly, when cue validities are
explicitly given rather than learned by trial-and-error, and when the environment is
deterministic (Newell and Shanks, 2003). According to evidence from eye-tracking,
participants use an ordered search heuristic with easily-accessible cues but use a
compensatory strategy when cue information is more difficult to retrieve, (Platzer
et al., 2014).
Even experiments assuming a weighted-adding model for information aggre-
gation can suggest satisficing. Newell et al. (2009) tested participants in a four-cue
decision environment with the goal of predicting whether share price for an unknown
company would increase based on the values of those four cues. After each deci-
sion, participants got feedback on the trial based on their assigned conditions. In
one condition, participants saw the probability of the share price increasing based
on the observed cue pattern. The other condition simply saw a message stating
whether the share price did or did not increase for that trial. The long-run fre-
8
quencies of the dichotomous messages from the latter condition matched the stated
probabilities seen in the former condition so that information was held constant
between conditions; only the format of the information differed. While this manipu-
lation was sufficient to cause better performance for the probability-feedback group,
the advantage disappeared in a second study. Rather than providing feedback af-
ter each trial, participants saw either probabilistic or dichotomous information for
each cue at each trial. That is, for each cue, participants saw either the probabil-
ity of share price increasing for the current value or the cue, or saw a dichotomous
increases/decreases paired with each cue value. Though the actual probabilities con-
tained more information than the dichotomies that would enable higher performance
is used rationally, both conditions performed at approximately the same level. This
pattern of results suggests that telling participants the unit value of a cue prior to
learning was sufficient to remove any effect of metric feedback on cue utilization.
The environment for this series of studies could be predicted with relatively high
accuracy (80%) using only unit weights for each cue, so further specification of cue
weights may not have justified the additional effort to discover relative cue weights.
The use of unit weights is rather simple, requiring only tallying of cues in favor of
each alternative. Use of specific cue weights, on the other hand, required adding
multiple rational numbers together, a process that may be difficult for individuals
even without the added, implicit time pressure of the task. Participants may have
been inclined to achieve satisfactory performance by using the simpler rule, since
the more complex rule yields only slightly higher accuracy and is much more taxing
to implement. This study reveals either a preference for a simple decision rule that
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involves tallying unit weights for cues (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974; Dawes, 1979), or
shows that participants satisfice by ignoring additional information having achieved
sufficient performance by their individual standards.
Some evidence suggests that TTB is a viable model of human inference. Hog-
arth and Karelaia (2007) investigated a variety of decision models (including TTB
and WADD) across a range of decision environments. They found that predic-
tive success of different decision models depends on the structure of the underlying
ecology. Assuming a toolbox of decision rules, accuracy is maximized by applying
tools that match the ecology. For example, they find that TTB is more accurate
than alternate models in non-compensatory environments. Another study showed
that TTB was among the multiple decision tools necessary to capture variability
in participant responses in a decision task. Cognitive toolbox models have been
criticized for allowing unlimited flexibility – a researcher can always add another
tool to account for unexplained variance or patterns in decisions (Glöckner et al.,
2010). Scheibehenne et al. (2013) fit hierarchical Bayesian models to data from a
number of different experiments to validate the idea of a cognitive toolbox and to
demonstrate a method of comparing toolbox models while accounting for flexibility
in inferences. They find that, across many of these experiments, the combination of
TTB and WADD provides the most parsimonious account of participant choices.
Despite the normative success of fast and frugal heuristics, they may not de-
scribe the actual decision process that people use. Hilbig et al. (2010) proposed the
nonsensical alphabet heuristic and showed that its use in a decision task comparing
city populations produced results comparable to the recognition and fluency heuris-
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tics. He argued that similar performance between a heuristic and participants on
a task is insufficient to claim that participants use that heuristic. Instead, other
aspects of the decision process must be considered. In TTB, for example, partic-
ipants must demonstrably search cues in the same order as TTB and also make
similar inferences in order to claim that TTB is applied. Despite TTB’s simplicity,
Dougherty et al. (2008) criticize the calculation of cue validity as implausible. They
argue that the an automatic event-counter is unsupported by existing evidence in
frequency encoding and that cue validity requires people to remember the absence
of information, conflicting with logic and memory research.
Some researchers argue that TTB is part of an ecologically rational toolbox of
decision algorithms that are selected and used as a function of fit to the environment.
While the contents of the toolbox are debated, most of these proposals include
some mixture of simultaneous and sequential search tools that vary the use of cue
weights. For example, people could combine all information (simultaneous search)
either by weighting cues by their CV (WADD) or simply by aggregating cues with
unit weights (Dawes, 1979). Though TTB requires search of cues ordered by their
decreasing CV, search could also be in random cue order to limit the computational
burden of calculating cue orders (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer and
Todd, 1999).
A number of studies alter the proposed WADD and TTB models originally
compared in Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996). One proposed change is allowing a
probability of guessing rather than applying the specified model (Bergert and Nosof-
sky, 2007; Lee and Newell, 2011). This change accounts for the high variability in
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subject responses to most behavioral tasks. No single decision algorithm captures
the responses made by participants in observed decision environments, in part be-
cause participants appear to be inconsistent in applying a given decision rule.
Another change alters the function used to weight or order cues. Newell et al.
(2004) show superior prediction in many environments using success, a cue value
metric defined as CV times DR, added to the product of one minus the discrimina-
tion rate times the probability of a correct choice when guessing.
Success = CV ·DR + 1
2
(1−DR) (1.3)
This method combines the probability that a cue will discriminate between alter-
natives with the probability of guessing and the probability of choosing the correct
alternative given that a cue discriminates, producing an aggregate measure of single-
cue usefulness.
Others suggest meta-heuristics to choose among heuristics in the toolbox for
application in a given environment. Strategy Selection Learning theory (SSL) is
one framework for comparing the use of simultaneous and sequential information
search (Rieskamp and Otto, 2006). SSL claims that individuals learn which decision
heuristic is best fit to an environment based on repeated feedback. One strength of
SSL is that it encodes the heuristic toolbox, fully accounting for the flexibility of
allowing many possible decision heuristics. In SSL, each decision heuristic is fully
encoded as a model. SSL assumes that, over a number of learning trials, participants
compare the predictive accuracy for each model and selectively reinforce models
that provide higher accuracy within an environment. When a simulated learner
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is allowed to learn to apply either WADD or TTB over repeated feedback trials,
SSL yields higher accuracy (measured by percent correct) than WADD, TTB, or
a memory-like categorization model. This evidence has been expanded to suggest
that certain environmental characteristics occupy a cognitive niche that predispose
decision makers to use one of a number of decision heuristics (Marewski and Schooler,
2011).
Based on the evidence reviewed above, it is obvious that there are competing
models of how cues are generated and ordered in the context of inference tasks. In
what follows, I outline three contemporary models of this process, which will then
serve as the basis for the remainder of this dissertation.
1.1 Search
Cue metrics like CV and DR, or aggregation methods like TTB and WADD,
may occupy the ends of two spectra used in decision making heuristics. While the
success metric gives an optimal method for combining CV and DR, participants
show variability in preferred search order that may be related to preference for
valid or discriminating cues. Similarly, people may apply WADD or TTB in the
same decision environment. Lee and Newell (2011) developed a pair of hierarchical
Bayesian to describe individual differences in cue ordering and search termination
called Search and Stop. Search and Stop are a complimentary pair of models that
determine the order and number of searched cues based on compromises between
CV and DR and between all-reason and one-reason decision making. The Search
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model assumes that participants order cues and make inferences similar to TTB.
At the participant level, Search includes two parameters that distinguish it from
TTB: γ and w. The γ parameter indexes the probability of choosing counter to the
model prediction. TTB is normally a deterministic model, participants are assumed
to choose whichever alternative has an earlier discriminating cue. Allowing for
errors in applying the TTB model can reduce the penalty of incorrect estimates
for participants that choose inconsistently or are otherwise poorly fit by the TTB
model. The w parameter allows participants to weight CV and DR:
weight = CV · w + (1− w) ·DR.
Participants then search cues by ranking weight from largest to smallest. The Search
model also includes hyperparameters for the mean and standard deviation of w.
Partially pooling estimates of w in this case simultaneously improves individual
estimates of w and summarizes the individual differences in search order. The
Search model in isolation assumes that participants apply an error-prone TTB to
make decisions but allows for individual differences in search order.
The Stop model captures differences between application of TTB and WADD
by participant while assuming a fixed search order for cues. The model assumes
that participants either apply TTB with probability θ or WADD with probability
1 − θ. Though more complicated than either WADD or TTB, a comparison of a
modified Stop model with SSL shows that the complexity of SSL is almost never
justified. Based on minimum description length, an information-theoretic measure
of model complexity that balances fit and parsimony, Stop is preferred to stochastic
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WADD and TTB across a range of plausible error rates (Newell and Lee, 2011). A
similar comparison has not been performed for the Search model with alternative
models of stochastic search order.
One way Search and Stop prevail is by allowing individual differences in deci-
sion strategy. By including hierarchical structure allowing cue ordering and model
selection to vary by participant, the models account for variation that could oth-
erwise be attributed to inconsistency in decision heuristic application. Compared
with SSL, Stop is able to model individuals varying propensity to choose randomly
or to prefer additional information. Stop also avoids the problem of fully encoding
both TTB and WADD separately by adding a parameter to generalize between the
alternative heuristics. Search and Stop are only tested on a single environment at
a time, however, and can only account for individual differences in weighting of CV
and DR or WADD and TTB. If decision making varies along any other dimensions,
the Search and Stop models will be insufficient.
1.2 Delta Inference
The original conception of TTB operates on dichotomous cues, so all cue com-
parisons are either equal or differ by one. Luan et al. (2014) proposed Delta Inference
(∆I) as an elaboration on TTB that allows for continuous cue values. This slight
change alters the potential flexibility of TTB. TTB operates by choosing an alterna-
tive based on a single discriminating cue, regardless of the discrepancy between cue
values for the alternative choices. In DI, the stopping rule in TTB is amended to
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stop cue search only when cue values for alternatives differ by more than a certain
amount, ∆. This potentially allows search to continue despite a discriminating cue,
when the difference between cue values is smaller that ∆, allowing some flexibility to
accommodate compensatory ecological structures. Note that this is still one-reason
decision making. While mere difference may not be sufficient to motivate a decision
in ∆I, that cue has no bearing on the decision process during later cue considera-
tion. This is different from a change like that in the Stop model, which weights the
number of cues to aggregate in a decision (Lee and Newell, 2011) or another model
which assumes that both TTB and WADD are accessible tools (Newell and Lee,
2011; Scheibehenne et al., 2013; Rieskamp and Otto, 2006).
Though (Luan et al., 2014) show that a ∆ of 0 is best on average, they do not
explore the fitting of ∆ for subjects, environments, or cues. ∆I is also not compared
to human performance, so its predictive validity for real decisions with non-zero ∆
parameters, (where ∆ = 0 is equivalent to TTB), is unknown.
1.3 Hypothesis Generation
Another decision modeling framework comes the Hypothesis Generation (Hy-
Gene) model (Thomas et al., 2008). While not a decision making model per se,
HyGene is a model of memory search based on MINERVA-2 (Hintzman, 1984). In
addition to being consistent with memory research, HyGene has accurately modeled
other psychological phenomena, including subadditivity (Dougherty et al., 1999) and
visual search (Buttaccio et al., 2015). HyGene requires little substantial alteration
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to produce decisions on a paired comparison task. Modifying HyGene to make in-
ferences provides an opportunity to evaluate existing decision rules in the context
of a plausible theory of memory, (which is missing in Search and violated by most
fast and frugal heuristics).
In the HyGene model, memory is divided into episodic memory, semantic
memory, and working memory. Episodic memory contains a memory trace, a vector
of features taking the values 0, −1, or 1, for each event or experience. The traces
in episodic memory are subject to degradation through forgetting and interference,
governed by a learning rate, L. Traces in episodic memory also encode frequency
information in the environment: Events that occur and are encoded more frequently
appear proportionally more often than less frequent events. In contrast, semantic
memory encodes each potential outcome only once, regardless of the frequency of
any individual event. For example, an emergency room doctor is likely to have
diagnosed influenza much more often than smallpox. The doctor’s episodic memory
would contain a large number of feature vectors corresponding to influenza and few
if any for smallpox, but each would appear a single time in semantic memory. In
HyGene, working memory is a constraint on the number of semantic memory traces
that can be considered as hypotheses at one time.
Hypothesis generation is motivated by a probe, or an event about which a
hypothesis is necessary. In this recent example, the symptoms of a patient would
act as a probe. The HyGene model assumes that people decide among hypotheses
by first probing episodic memory to determine similarity between each event and the
probe. Mathematically, this is accomplished by calculating the dot product between
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where P and T are a probe and trace of length N and i indexes the number of traces
in episodic memory. The cube of similarity (S3i ) is then compared to AC , the latter
being a free parameter in the model. AC acts as a cutoff similarity value to limit
search of memory to relevant traces. All traces with cubed similarities higher than
AC are used to generate a hypothesis, while all traces with lower similarities are
ignored for subsequent calculations.
After identifying the relevant subset of memory, HyGene creates a conditional





Each trace in episodic memory is multiplied by its cubed similarity and the resulting
vectors are summed element-wise. The vector result of this process, normalized by
dividing all values by the absolute value of the largest value in the vector, is an
“unspecified probe” which combines the diagnostic information in the probe with
base rate information from episodic memory. The dot product of this unspecified
probe and each entry in semantic memory, yielding a semantic activation (SA) for
each semantic trace. Traces with SA higher than zero then enter the set of leading
contenders (SOC), a capacity-limited proxy for working memory. The entire search
process: activate a subset of memory, create an unspecified probe, generate seman-
tic activations, and populate the SOC, repeats until a pre-determined number of
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iterations. The end result is a short-term store (the SOC) filled with hypotheses
about the probe and their associated activations from semantic memory.
The HyGene process requires little change to search for cue orders based on
the contents of memory. A probe of each cue value could be used to search memory,
returning the short-term buffer’s worth of cues that predict the highest values on
the criterion value for a given decision environment along with their activations.
Activation for each cue should condense DR and CV into a single measure and mimic
success or Search model results. Thus, HyGene potentially gives a psychologically
plausible method for calculating cue orders. This dissertation includes modeling
studies that test this intuition and evaluate the necessity of complicated decision
rules and metric derivation beyond memory processes. For example, calculation of
CVs and cue ordering in general may be obviated by instead relying on emergent
properties of episodic memory search. One might also reduce the stochasticity of
WADD and TTB in Search by allowing cue orders to be determined by memory
search, which is already a stochastic process.
1.3.1 Summary
Search, Delta Inference, and HyGene are models that seek to explain decision
making behavior at different levels of analysis. Search captures abstract, individual
differences in search order and error of strategy application. Though initial work
with ∆I focused on average values of ∆ across environments, ∆I could be adapted
to investigate whether individual differences in decision making are limited to differ-
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ences in ∆, the difference between cue values necessary to motivate a decision. The
HyGene framework contains different restrictions, only containing free (and poten-
tially varying) parameters that are involved in memory processes. These levels of
explanation coincide with David Marr’s levels of analysis (Marr, 1982). Search exists
at the computational level of analysis, focusing primarily the types of information
that are required to accurately capture patterns in cue search and judgment. ∆I
parameterizes specific components of the algorithm used to combine information,
while HyGene focuses on details of the implementation of a decision algorithm in
the context of a subordinate memory system. Unfortunately, these models are all
evaluated in different ways. Search exists as a hierarchical Bayesian model with
parameters that are partially pooled by individual, while ∆I and HyGene are both
fit with maximum likelihood that average over individual differences. This disser-
tation formulates all three models as hierarchical Bayesian models to allow direct
comparison across these models and corresponding levels of analysis.
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Chapter 2: Bayesian implementations of inference models
Comparing Search, ∆I, and HyGene requires both common implementation
methods and shared data. The present chapter includes descriptions of hierarchical
Bayesian implementations for models of inference based on Search, ∆ Inference, and
HyGene. Hierarchical Bayesian modeling allows natural extension to include indi-
vidual differences, summarizes these differences with fixed parameters, and provides
a very general method for relating cognitive models to observed data (Lee, 2010).
There is a recurring structure present in all three models under consideration. The
w for Search and ∆I, ∆ for ∆I, and β for HyGene all vary by participant but are
drawn from a distribution with parameters that are fixed across participants. Draw-
ing participant parameters from shared distributions allows the models to bring the
maximum information available to bear on estimating each parameter (Lee, 2008),
and represents a compromise between fully pooled estimates, which assume that
participants are identical, and unpooled estimates, which assume that participants
are entirely unique (Gelman and Hill, 2006).
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2.1 Search
The Search model, already a hierarchical Bayesian implementation, is drawn
almost directly from Lee and Newell (2011). Given the focus on cue ordering, which
is the major difference between Search and the comparison models, I ignore the
Stop model entirely. The stopping rule in Stop is modeled independent of search
order; Search determines search order by individual after which Stop subsequently
determines the number of cues searched. These studies focus on how the models
order cues differently and whether this influences judgments, though later work
could examine the interaction with varied stopping rules.
The Search model is completely described in Figure 2.1. The order of cue
search is governed by a weighted combination of CV and DR. The individually-
varying relative weight for CV is drawn from a bounded normal distribution with
both mean and variance varying as beta distributions with α = β = 1 and bounds
at .01 and .99. The DR weight is 1 minus the CV weight. Based on this balance
of CV and DR, the cues are searched sequentially until any difference between the
cues allows for the model to stop and choose one of the two alternatives. The model
then selects the TTB-chosen alternative with probability of γ or the alternative
with probability 1 − γ. This allows the model to account for the fact that human
participants very rarely apply a single decision rule consistently. In the event that
two alternatives are exactly tied on all cue values, the model chooses between the
alternative with an equal probability for each outcome.




µ ∼ Beta(1, 1)
σ ∼ Beta(1, 1)
wi ∼ N (µ, σ), wi ∈ (a, b), 0.01 < a < b < 0.99
si = Rank(wi · v · (1− wi · d))





γ if TTBsi(aj, bj) = a













Figure 2.1: Graphical model of Search.
with continuous, rather than dichotomous, cue values. While changing the cue
support should not pose any problems for the Search framework, one goal of this
dissertation is to assure that changing the support of these cue values does not
interfere with the model.
23
2.2 Delta Inference
For the purpose of this study, the ∆ Inference model is a modified version of
the Search model including an elaboration that potentially allows the TTB search
algorithm to continue past a discriminating cue (Luan et al., 2014). In some cases,
a small difference in cue values may not be sufficiently informative to terminate
search. The ∆ parameter is allowed to vary by both cue and participant, so the
model converges on ∆ parameters most consistent with the data. While ∆I modifies
the stopping rule for TTB, it does so in a way that preserves one-reason decision
making. When ∆I makes a decision, it is based only on the value of a single cue;
previous cues are treated as ties and ignored. Unlike the Stop model, the stopping
rule from ∆I can interact with CV and DR weighting, influencing search order.
Earlier research showed that, on average, the best value of ∆ is zero (Luan
et al., 2014). This research kept a consistent value of ∆ across all cues and individ-
uals in the studies, though, precluding the possibility that individuals or cues might
differ in their values of ∆. Varying ∆ by person amounts to the suggestion that
individuals may differ in the amount of information they require before making a
decision; varying by cue allows that cues can be differentially informative. Instead
of a consistent value of ∆ for all cues and participants, I allow ∆ to vary across
both of these dimensions. Though the ∆s for each cue are independent, I define
a hyperparameter for each cue’s ∆ and allow subject-varying deviations from this





µ∆k ∼ Beta(1, 1) σ∆k ∼ Beta(1, 1)
∆ik ∼ N (µ∆, σ∆),∆ik ∈ (a, b), 0 < a < b <∞
µ ∼ Beta(1, 1) σ ∼ Beta(1, 1)
wi ∼ N (µ, σ), wi ∈ (a, b), 0.01 < a < b < 0.99
si = Rank(wi · v · (1− wi · d))





γ if TTBsi(aj, bj + ∆i.) = a

















Figure 2.2: Graphical model of Delta Inference.
2.3 Hypothesis Generation
The version of HyGene used in this dissertation is a Bayesian model inspired
by Thomas et al. (2008). This HyGene implementation decides between pairs of
choices by searching sequentially through cues (as in TTB) and using a minimal
difference in cues to terminate search and select an alternative (Figure 2.3). Search
order is determined by using weighted logistic regression on scaled cue values for
a training set, deemed episodic memory or M in the graphical model, to generate
normalized regression coefficients. Cues are searched in descending order of coeffi-
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cient magnitude, serving as a proxy for CV and DR as used directly in both Search
and ∆I. After determining search order based on the normalized regression weights,
HyGene makes decisions like the Search model, complete with a γ parameter for




µβk ∼ N (0, 1)
σβk ∼ Exp(1)
µβik ∼ N (µβk, σβk)
σβik ∼ Exp(1)
βijk ∼ N (µβik, σβik)
wij = τ([aj, bj],M)
ytrain ∼ Bernoulli(logit−1(βikw2j ·M))
sij = Rank(−|βij.|)





γ if TTBsi(aj, bj) = a

















Figure 2.3: Graphical model of HyGene.
There are two major differences between the current instantiation of HyGene
and the model specified by Thomas et al. (2008). The first is that the current instan-
tiation uses continuous weighting for episodic memory traces. Rather than using a
threshold (AC) and ignoring memory traces below a modeled or assumed thresh-
old, the current HyGene implementation accomplishes a similar goal by weighting
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observations in episodic memory more heavily as a function of the magnitude of
ordinal correlation with the cue values for a given observation. The current method
of weighted regression should have similar performance to selecting relevant memory
traces based on AC . Assuming a true non-linearity in trace selection, the weighted
regression technique in the current HyGene model provides a first-order, smoothed
approximation of the discrete, underlying function (Shalizi, 2015). The AC param-
eter is is a context-free value without a comparable parameter in Search or ∆I.
Inferences from the hierarchical Bayesian are based on fixed parameters and search
orders, so removing AC in favor of continuous weighting of episodic memory im-
proves interpretability of comparisons with Search and ∆I.
The second difference is that this HyGene instantiation is allowed to search
all cues in the ecology. The original HyGene model includes a finite SOC, which
limits the number of simultaneous activated semantic traces, in this case cues, that
an individual can consider. The limited SOC could easily be included in any of
the models currently under consideration and could have a variety of difficult-to-
predict effects on search order and judgment accuracy. Similarly, nothing about
HyGene requires sequential search, the model could aggregate over a subset of cues
to produce a response. Given the focus on search order, HyGene is implemented
with only the weighting mechanic and uses a TTB-like stopping and decision rule
on HyGene-ordered cues to minimize differences from the comparison models.
These decisions about HyGene modeling produce a version of the model that
is maximally comparable to Search and ∆I, allowing for a direct inspection of the
cue ordering mechanism without interference from other model dissimilarities. The
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γ parameter, for example, increases model flexibility by allowing some proportion
of responses that violate the direct predictions from sequential search of the cues.
Exclusion of this modification, which is present only in Search and not in ∆I or
HyGene as originally formulated, potentially conflates the cue ordering mechanism
and other, empirically-motivated modeling decisions.
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Chapter 3: Cross-validation of models to simulated data
One aspect of comparing computationally-specified theories of decision making
is understanding the relative flexibility of these theories. There are at least three
ways to validate new modeling methods:
1. analytic proof of behavior in the limit;
2. validation on a standard dataset; or,
3. validation on simulated data.
The first method is intractable in the case of most cognitive process models, the
current models included. Closed-form solutions to these models would be difficult
both because of the diverse prior specifications and because of the unconventional
likelihood statement. The second method will be useful later when an external refer-
ence helps explore the usefulness of these cognitive models in naturalistic conditions.
These data lack a defined generating process, however; no model can be identified
as correct in these circumstances. The only alternative is model comparison, but
the best method to compare cognitive models is under debate. Therefore, simulated
data will fuel an initial attempt to understand how Search, ∆I, and HyGene relate
to one another.
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This chapter will focus on two questions. The first is: How do Search, ∆I,
and HyGene account for decision processes in simulated environments with known
structure? This question is answered with two ecologies that vary in predictive
difficulty. The simpler of these ecologies has orthogonal, non-compensatory cues.
This means that the cues are uncorrelated with one another and that predictions
based on the strongest cue cannot be reversed by any combination of subsequent
cues. This first ecology is contrasted with a second ecology that has compensatory
cue structure and positive cue intercorrelations.
The second question for this chapter is: How related are the predictions from
Search, ∆ Inference, and HyGene? Though this question will return regarding data
generated by human decision makers, using simulated data allows for direct exam-
ination of how structure in the environment is represented in the fixed parameters
of each model. Fitting the three models to the same environments also allows for
understanding of interactions between the shared components among the models
(e.g., γ) and their unique components.
3.1 Methods
The questions in this chapter require both generating structured ecologies and
fitting of relevant cognitive models (Search, ∆I, HyGene).
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Ecology 1 Ecology 2
Outcome 1 2 3 Outcome 1 2 3
Outcome 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.1
1 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.2
2 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.2
3 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.0
Table 3.1: Covariance Matrices for both simulated ecologies.
Ecologies
Both ecologies are generated from multivariate normal distributions with all
means equal to zero, the defining ecologies differ only in their covariances. The
first ecology consists of 20 samples from a covariance matrix with three orthogonal
cues and decreasing correlations with the outcome (Table 3.1). Though dissimilar
from the empirical data in later chapters, this ecology will provide a reference for
all models. The cues in the first ecology are non-compensatory, so both sequential
and simultaneous cue use both reach the same conclusions on these stimuli. The
strict orthogonality of the cues also makes cue weighting easier, allowing inspection
of the relative influence the priors in each model have on cue ordering. This ecology
also permits assessment of the influence of individual differences in cue order drawn
directly from the priors in each model. Direct fits to any fixed ecology should lead to
a consistent search order. Differing search orders in this ecology reflect the influence
of prior information in each model.
The second ecology is intended to be closer to empirical data than the first.
The cues are poorer indicators of the outcome on average and have non-zero covari-
ances. The set of objects in the ecology are also more numerous, with 100 unique
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objects instead of 20 as in the simple ecology. While the simple ecology is intended
as a reference distribution to help assess prior influence, the complex ecology serves
to foreshadow the success of these models when fitting messier, empirical data. The
difference is that this complex ecology still has a known structure. While empir-
ical samples are useful for different reasons, we have no way of knowing the true
population structure from which they are drawn.
Each ecology is used to generate three distinct sets of data, one corresponding
to each Search, ∆I, and HyGene. The priors from each model are used to gen-
erate parameters for 20 imaginary participants. These parameters are then used
to produce responses to all paired comparisons of the objects in each of the two
ecologies. For each set of generated data, shared parameter values are consistent
across models. For example, γ is consistent across all three models and w for each
“participant” is the same for both Search and ∆I within an ecology.
Simulations
I produced simulations from each model with each of the two ecologies. For
Ecology 1, the training set consisted of simulated model predictions for all 190 unique
pairs of stimuli in the 20-object ecology. The training set for Ecology 2 consisted
of only a subset of the possible stimulus pairs. Though the second ecology includes
100 objects, the training set included only 100 random pairs of these objects rather
than the exhaustive 4,950 pairs. I generated hypothetical participants’ responses
for each ecology to allow for a representative range of the individual differences for
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each model. After simulating these responses, I fit each of the three models using
to the generated responses and the same training set.
Analyses of the results both assess model performance and examine how differ-
ent sources of variability are represented in each joint posterior distribution. Model
performance can be examined in a variety of ways. I first present both the likeli-
hood and the penalized likelihood using the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC;
Spiegelhalter et al., 2002), which communicates average model effectiveness when
accounting for complexity:
DIC = −2 log L+ v̂ar(−2 log L). (3.1)
For the DIC, complexity is a measure of the range in data that could be fit by
the model and is measured as the observed variance in deviances observed in a
convergent MCMC model1. Model comparison using the raw likelihood may make
sense in this context. Human decision making is a complex, and perhaps stochastic,
process, so any preference for simpler models, especially in a dataset of such limited
size relative to the variation in the decision making system, may be unjustified. One
caveat is that these densely-parameterized models allow for individual differences in
different parameters for each model. Model comparison using penalized likelihood
is especially unstable in these types of models because the likelihood function is
very flat and the appropriate penalty is contentious (Weng and Gelman, 2014). In
addition to fit statistics (log likelihood and DIC), posterior distributions of the fixed
effects are reported for each model. The summarized fixed effects include γ for all
1The complexity term, v̂ar(−2 log L), is commonly referred to as the penalty.
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models and the means and standard deviations of w for Search and ∆I, ∆ in ∆I,
and β in HyGene.
A major goal in this chapter is to assess overall model flexibility. Though both
∆ Inference and HyGene are instantiated as elaborations on the Search model in
this series of studies, it is possible that the additional parameters for these models
dramatically change model flexibility. The following analyses take data generated
from each of the three models using the two ecologies specified in the methods and
then fit each of the three models to this generated data.
All inferences are based on models fit using JAGS (Plummer et al., 2003) and
called from the rjags package in R (Plummer, 2015). JAGS is a C++ implementation
of a Gibbs sampler. Parameters in each model met minimum R̂ and effective n
diagnostic criteria prior to further analysis. R̂ is ratio of between- and within-chain
variability, with values larger than 1 indicating poor mixing. Effective n is a measure
of MCMC sample size that accounts for autocorrelation between successive samples.
While no strict cutoff exists for effective n, a few hundred independent samples is




Ecology 1 γ 0.9
CV 0.663, 0.668, 0.511
DR 1, 1, 1
Ecology 2 γ 0.9
CV 0.61, 0.69, 0.59
DR 1, 1, 1
Table 3.2: Fixed parameters for data generation.
3.2 Results
First Ecology
Samples from multivariate normal distributions with the aforementioned pa-
rameters yielded CV and DR rates seen in Table 3.22. For both ecologies, the second
cue gives the highest CV, followed by the first cue and then the third cue. There
are no tied cue values, so all cues discriminate between all paired comparisons and
DRk = 1.
The results of fitting Search, ∆I, and HyGene to data generated using Ecol-
ogy 1 show nearly equivalent performance for Search and HyGene (Table 3.3). ∆I
is consistently, if only slightly, better able to account for variability in simulated
participant responses as reflected by higher average likelihoods. While counter to
earlier research, this suggests that non-zero ∆ parameters may be useful in some
decision environments. Particularly in ecologies like the one generated, where many
cue values are near the mean and explain relatively little variance in the outcome,
ignoring small cue differences and continuing search may be more important than a
2Values throughout this dissertation are rounded to an appropriate number of significant digits.
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simpler model (Search) or a more flexible method of ordering cues (HyGene). Pre-
ferring ∆I to Search and HyGene for these data grants that the small differences
between likelihoods and DICs are credible and favor ∆I, which may be unjustified
given the small differences between model fits.
Data HyGene
Model HyGene Search ∆I
log L −1386 −1385 −1378
Penalty 1.276 0.7953 7.074
DIC 2773 2771 2763
Data Search
Model HyGene Search ∆I
log L −1386 −1387 −1361
Penalty 1.019 0.2386 28.71
DIC 2774 2774 2750
Data Delta Inference
Model HyGene Search ∆I
log L −1387 −1384 −1377
Penalty 0.48 0.9434 8.579
DIC 2774 2769 2762
Table 3.3: Summaries of models fit to data generated from each model using first
ecology.
While the patterns in fit quality for Ecology 1 make sense given the continuous
cue values, posterior distributions for the parameters that summarize each model
suggest poor calibration, (Table 3.2). Though the γ parameter for all data gen-
eration processes was very close to 1 (Table 3.2), all models returned a posterior
distribution on γ with a median closer to 1
2
. ∆I gives higher values for γ, but noth-
ing close to the true, fixed value of 9
10
. All three models are nearly guessing at the
outcome, given that the probability of a model-inconsistent response is nearly as




Model HyGene Search ∆I
HyGene γ 0.52 0.51 0.51
µβ −0.04, −0.06, −0.26 −0.03, −0.04, −0.3 −0.04, −0.04, −0.25
σβ 0.27, 0.42, 1.07 0.28, 0.38, 1.13 0.24, 0.39, 1.07
Search γ 0.52 0.5 0.53
µw 0.53 0.53 0.48
σw 0.7 0.71 0.71
∆I γ 0.55 0.6 0.56
µ∆ 0.66, 0.2, 0.59 0.69, 0.14, 0.91 0.16, 0.77, 0.2
σ∆ 0.2, 0.4, 1.74 0.89, 0.24, 0.13 0.37, 1.24, 0.48
µw 0.51 0.5 0.51
σw 0.7 0.71 0.71
Ecology 2
Generating Model
Model HyGene Search ∆I
HyGene γ 0.55 0.53 0.55
β ≈ 0, 0.01, −0.19 ≈ 0, ≈ 0, −0.2 ≈ 0, 0.01, −0.22
σβ 0.22, 0.31, 0.76 0.21, 0.27, 0.8 0.23, 0.29, 0.73
Search γ 0.53 0.53 0.53
µw 0.51 0.51 0.5
σw 0.71 0.69 0.71
∆I γ 0.64 0.64 0.65
µ∆ 0.11, 0.72, 0.87 0.14, 0.97, 0.81 0.12, 0.55, 0.8
σ∆ 0.24, 0.23, 0.11 0.2, 0.08, 0.06 0.23, 0.08, 0.06
µw 0.48 0.5 0.52
σw 0.71 0.71 0.71
Table 3.4: Median fixed effects for all models fit to simulated data by generating
model. γ is the probability of choosing consistent with the terminating model pre-
diction (i.e., not failing to apply the model), µw is the average relative weight of CV
and DR, and σw is the standard deviation of relative weight parameters. µ∆ and
σ∆ give the mean and standard deviation of the delta parameters for each cue, in-
dicating the distribution of differences in cue values needed to terminate search. µβ
and σβ give the distributions for the weights in HyGene, indicating average search
order.
Search order for HyGene follows the covariance between each cue and the
outcome, on average, searching the first, then second, and finally third cue. The
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standard deviation on the βs for HyGene is quite small for the first two µβ param-
eters, but large for the third cue, suggesting that this cue is sometimes searched
first. HyGene has separate search orders for each item. The high participant-wise
variability seen in σβ3 is a reflection of the fact that, for some items, β3 is larger
than β1. Both µw and σw for Search and ∆I follow the prior distributions for these
parameters. No value of w will change the search order for these data because of
the invariant DR values, so both models search in descending order of CV. The ∆
parameters for Ecology 1 are larger than zero with a relatively small σ∆. This means
that Search claimed all participants searched only the second cue and then made a
decision, while ∆I participants searched the second cue and occasionally continued
on to the first and then third cues, guessing only if all three cues differed by less
than the applicable value of ∆.
Second Ecology
The results of fitting each model to data generated from Ecology 2 are similar
to Ecology 1, with larger differences between the models (Table 3.5). On average, ∆I
is preferred based on likelihood and DIC. This is a product of the noisy environment
in which small differences in cue values are even less likely to correctly favor the
larger outcome value. No ties exist for any cues in this environment and DR is
always 1, causing Search to examine exactly one cue (the second cue) and make a
decision based on these values. HyGene is allowed to search in different orders but
also picks based on whatever cue is searched first. Only ∆I stops as a function of
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Data HyGene
Model HyGene Search ∆I
log L −1377 −1383 −1339
Penalty 3.373 1.033 6.811
DIC 2757 2767 2685
Data Search
Model HyGene Search ∆I
log L −1384 −1383 −1332
Penalty 1.807 0.9384 7.152
DIC 2769 2767 2671
Data Delta Inference
Model HyGene Search ∆I
log L −1376 −1384 −1340
Penalty 3.636 0.9114 3.746
DIC 2755 2769 2685
Table 3.5: Summaries of models fit to data generated from each model using second
ecology.
informativeness for the first cue. When differences between the first-cue values are
sufficient large, ∆I ceases search; otherwise, it continues through the other cues and
either stops or guesses.
Table 3.2 gives the median values for all participant-varying (and cue-varying,
as appropriate) parameters for the models fit to each set of data in each ecology.
Compared with the posteriors for these parameters in Ecology 1, the models for
Ecology 2 estimate approximately the same γ values despite the noisier ecology.
This can only be attributed to bias in the models, not surprising given that decision




The simulations presented above illuminate how Search, ∆I, and HyGene op-
erate on both structured and noisy data. To explore this, I cross-fit each model to
data generated from each of the three models from two separate underlying ecologies.
One major consideration, which in hindsight is obvious, is that the Search
method of weighting CV and DR is only useful when there are unequal DRs for the
cues. This is much more likely with discretely-valued cues, unlike the continuously-
valued cues used in these investigations. As a result, Search effectively simplifies
to TTB with probability (1− γ) of choosing counter to the TTB prediction. Thus,
for these examples, Search is modeling no individual differences in search order. In
addition to a single search order governed entirely by CV, the perfect discrimination
rate of all cues means that Search was deciding based on a single cue and never
searching beyond that.
This equivalence of DR across cues also leads the ∆I model to a consistent
search order across participants. The difference between Search and ∆I is that,
because of the ∆ parameters, ∆I searches beyond the initial cue when the cue for
the objects under consideration differ by less then ∆1. While Search acts like an
error-prone TTB, ∆I sometimes searches additional cues to reach a decision.
In these environments, HyGene is the only model that can model differing
search orders. The relative weights of the cues for any given decision problem are
influenced by the similarity between the cues for the choices and the cues for each
of the choices in episodic memory, allowing cues to vary in importance between
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choices. The model allows for weights to vary on average between participants
as well, meaning search orders can vary both by individual and by item. This
gives HyGene an advantage when search order should actually vary along these
dimensions, assuming this variance is is sufficiently large relative to the error variance
in the underlying ecology. HyGene’s flexibility is unwarranted in noisy data or data
simulated from Search or ∆I processes, however, giving the model a higher penalized
likelihood relative to the other models on data generated with a consistent search
order.
The consistent search order used in generating Search and ∆I models leave
HyGene with unnecessary functionality on these simulated environments. This is
especially true in the second, more complex environment. The positive covariances
between the cues mean that, on average, the first cue is likely to partially encode the
information present in later cues. Search, and to some extent ∆I, decide based on
the first cue searched in this context, relying on the cue with highest CV. HyGene
behaves in much the same way except that the single, deciding cue is less likely to be
the highest-CV cue, since search order for HyGene can vary even with continuously-
valued cues.
These results are useful for understanding human decision making outside of
this modeling context. While the Search model is intended to improve understanding
of individual differences in decision making (Lee and Newell, 2011), it applies only
when there are sufficient ties in cue values to produce differences in DR. This is
either a substantial limitation on the generality of the Search model or requires the
discretization/dichotomization of available information is a necessary component
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of the underlying representations people use to make decisions. The assumption
that cues are learned or stored with discrete values is not necessarily unjustified or
even novel (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996), but is a strong assertion that should
be explicitly considered. This assumption is even testable, providing qualitative
falsifiability to the method of subject-varying cue ordering found in the Search
model. Search is based on a fixed value of w. If individuals show different search
orders with continuously-valued cues, then the proposed mechanism of cue ordering
by combining weighted CV and DR cannot account for this pattern and the Search
method of cue ordering must be altered or abandoned.
3.3.1 Summary
These simulated ecologies give important information about what to expect in
future model fitting. The CV/DR weighting parameter in Search and the current
version of ∆I will be more relevant with dichotomous cues but presents a potential
avenue for empirical testing of Search cue ordering adequacy. HyGene is the only
model under consideration that can account for search orders that differ by both in-
dividuals and test items, though this flexibility is unjustified in the current modeled
environments.
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Chapter 4: Prediction in a real-world data set
Though fitting models to simulated data can increase understanding of the
models themselves, inferential models must also fit data without known parameters.
Data generated from real environmental sources may differ in unpredictable ways
from data generated with known properties. In this chapter, I use a well-known
decision environment, the nine-cue ecology predicting population in German cities,
to compare the resulting posterior distributions on the parameters of Search, ∆I,
and HyGene.
Synthetic decision environments that come from fixed parameters and well-
behaved probability distributions may not accurately reflect these natural environ-
ments. While it is trivial to design environments that are difficult or impossible to
predict, people would simply guess in these circumstances. More interesting are en-
vironments that can be predicted despite uncertainty. Even difficult-but-predictable
environments must be difficult in the same way that ecologies encountered by human
decision makers are difficult. For these reasons, synthetic ecologies are of limited
use.
Among existing decision ecologies, few are as thoroughly-explored as the Ger-
man cities task (GCT). This task has been used in a large number of studies on
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human memory and decision making (Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Gigerenzer, 1993;
Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996), providing a reasonable baseline for performance of
different models of decision making. The ecology for this task includes 9 dichoto-
mous cues use to predict the population of the 83 German cities with populations
larger than 100,000 (as of 1993, Figure 4.1).
Cue CV DR
Is the city is the national capital? 1 0.02
Was the city was an exposition site? 0.91 0.28
Does the city have a major-league soccer team? 0.87 0.3
Is the city on the Intercity line? 0.78 0.38
Is the city a state capital? 0.77 0.3
Is the license plate abbreviation more than one letter? 0.75 0.34
Is a university located in that city? 0.71 0.51
Is the city in the industrial belt? 0.56 0.3
Was the city in East Germany? 0.51 0.27
Table 4.1: Cues for the German Cities Task.
If the only goal was to predict city size, one could just as well check the CIA
fact book and get the best predictors of population size. The strength of the GCT,
in addition to being widely-used in the decision making literature, is that all of the
cues are relatively easy to remember and use, since each can only take on one of
two values. In addition to the supposed psychological plausibility of dichotomous
cue values, the GCT will allow a better comparison between cue ordering due to w
in Search and ∆I, ∆ in ∆I, and β in HyGene. While the modeling in Chapter 3
compared these three models, it accomplished this comparison in a way that largely
ignored the cue ordering aspects of Search and ∆I.
Delta Inference was designed to allow search of decision environments to con-
tinue past a marginal difference in cue values. Despite this, there is nothing in
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principle to prevent ∆I from operating on dichotomous cues. Despite a consistent
model structure, the interpretation of ∆ changes with dichotomous input. The pos-
terior distribution on a given participants ∆ parameter for any cue only potentially
changes decisions when it is ≥ 1. One can compare the density of the probability
distribution for ∆ above and below 1 to see how likely the model is to consider this
cue, conditioned on the search order dictated by w.
These data reflect consistent subject-wise search orders. The original purposes
of these data were to validate that the Search model can effectively model individual
differences in search order. This puts HyGene at a disadvantage, but allows us to
directly assess the influence of β priors when the data are generated with a single
search order by subject.
4.1 Methods
The following simulations use the models specified in Chapter 2. The only
slight difference is that cue values are dichotomous, rather than continuous, which
would be reflected in the aj and bj nodes for each model.
The data for this chapter come from earlier work on the Search model (Lee
and Newell, 2011). Twenty participants with 100 responses each are simulated using
search orders of the GCT that differ by participants but are consistent within a
participant across the 100 choices. These data are generated deterministically from
the Search model, albeit with stronger relationship to the criterion than in Chapter




Metric HyGene Search ∆I
log L −496.4 −482.7 −482.2
Penalty 46.47 5.904 47.71
DIC 1039 971.4 1012
Table 4.2: Model comparisons for HyGene, Search, and ∆I on the GCT.
Model fits using the GCT data are in Table 4.2. Search and ∆I are about
equally effective at explaining variance in participant judgments, though the sub-
stantial complexity for ∆I is unjustified according to the DIC. HyGene yields only
a slightly lower likelihood, though it is substantially more complicated than even
∆I and has a correspondingly higher penalized likelihood. This pattern of results
expected, given that the data are effectively generated from the Search model.
Model summaries are in Table 4.2. In this environment, all three models con-
verge on γ values near one. Only very rarely do the models assume that participants
misapply the decision rule and choose counter to the predictions of the model. The
median of the µβ parameters for HyGene suggest that this method of cue ordering
produces sightly different search behavior on average than the relative weight of CV
and DR. This is likely to be relatively inconsistent across participants, given the ac-
companying σβ parameter which are large relative to the sizes of the corresponding
µbetas.
Though HyGene produces different cue ordering, Search and ∆I have the same




µβ 0.01, 0, 0.02, −0.05, −0.21, −0.1, 0, −0.12, −0.04





µ∆ 0.54, 0.59, 0.6, 0.64, 0.67, 0.64, 0.59, 0.72, 0.61
σ∆ 0.88, 2.31, 2.12, 1.86, 1.56, 1.68, 2.3, 1.38, 1.61
µw 0.556
σw 0.3
Table 4.3: Median fixed effects for all models fit to simulated participants with the
GCT data. γ is the probability of choosing consistent with the terminating model
prediction (i.e., not failing to apply the model), µw is the average relative weight
of CV and DR, and σw is the standard deviation of relative weight parameters. µ∆
and σ∆ give the mean and standard deviation of the delta parameters for each cue,
indicating the distribution of differences in cue values needed to terminate search.
µβ and σβ give the distributions for the weights in HyGene, indicating average search
order.
sion of ∆ has little influence on search order: on average both Search and ∆I follow
CV until the fourth cue. Though µw and σw are similar for Search and ∆I, the
latter has non-zero probability density for each participant at ∆k > 0, resulting in
probabilistic search of each cue. Assuming the HyGene model, the average person
searches in a completely novel order, though the large standard deviations on the β
parameters suggest substantial variability in HyGene search order.
Model Median Search Order Unique Orders
HyGene 2, 3, 1, 6, 9, 7, 4, 8, 5 1,379
Search 1, 2, 3, 6, 4, 5, 8, 7, 9 174
∆I 1, 2, 3, 6, 4, 5, 8, 7, 9 269
Table 4.4: Search order information by model.
Recall that these data are generated with a consistent search order for each
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participant that is the results from a weighted combination of CV and DR for each
cue; Search is the true model for these data. We can see that, despite 20 true search
orders (one for each participant), Search still allocates some probability (via the
w parameter) to 174 unique search orders. Adding variability in ∆ allows the ∆I
model to identify 269 unique search orders. HyGene’s βs give even more flexibility,
exploring nearly 1,400 separate search orders. Each of these models explores far
fewer than the total possible search orders, which for nine cues is 362,880.
The flexibility to identify additional search orders is not necessarily inappro-
priate, given the probabilities associated with the parameter values that give rise to
these unique search orders. Figure 4.1 gives the distribution of τ order between the
true search order and those proposed by each model for each of the 20 participants.
τ order is the number of paired switches necessary to match the order between two
vectors, it is related the Kendall’s τ correlation coefficient. Search and ∆I overlap
substantially for all participants, though the ∆I densities are more dispersed than
those for Search. HyGene produces more varied results. The mean of the HyGene
density varies in relation to the Search mean by participant, with HyGene showing
higher numbers of disconcordances for some participants’ fitted search orders and
lower numbers for others.
The differences in search order between models must be interpreted with two
caveats in mind. The average likelihoods are comparable for all three models. De-
spite the differences between the models in fitting the true search order for each
participant, HyGene is only slightly worse at predicting participant responses. Also,
the wider dispersion of HyGene τ orders is due to the variety of search orders, which
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is a feature (and not a limitation) of the model. These τ distributions for HyGene
are collapsing over the 100 search orders by stimulus pair for each participant, each
of which is potentially unique. If participants truly search cues differently based on
the stimulus in question, then HyGene is almost certain to fit better in expectation























model Delta HyGene Search
Figure 4.1: Density of tau distance between generating search orders and model
search orders by participant, colored by model.
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4.3 Discussion
This chapter focuses on fitting the three models to simulated participants from
a widely-studied, naturally-occurring ecology. While this set of simulations does not
directly inform on human decision making, one can learn more about how uncer-
tainty is differently represented by each model. This establishes a baseline against
which to compare these models when fit to data generated by human participants.
One important observation is that, in the GCT ecology, the additional param-
eters in ∆I and HyGene lead to likelihoods that are comparable to Search, even
though Search is the true generating model. The current results contrast with the
results in Chapter 3, which found higher likelihoods for ∆I across most generating
models. This difference may be due to the relative predictability of the outcome
based on the cues, which is much higher for the GCT relative to the ecologies in





Table 4.5: Comparison of variance in outcome explained by cues in the ecologies
from chapters 1 and 2 using multiple regression.
At least one inference is consistent across all three models: The credible values
of γ are very close (Table 4.2). Despite differing cue-ordering mechanisms, simulated
participants make model-consistent responses at similar rates. Cue order matters
very little for accurately predicting population in this ecology. The similarity across
50
models could also reflect that a certain subset of comparisons are difficult or im-
possible predict based on the observed cue values. This consistency across models
is reassuring, though with a multiplicity of reasonable models, the only permissible
inferences are those for which the models agree (Breiman, 2001). In this case, one
can infer that participants are consistently choosing consistent with the result of the
TTB process, but should remain agnostic about the method of ordering cues, since
the models disagree on this and produce comparable likelihoods and DICs.
Interpretation of the ∆I model differs with dichotomous cues. This is because
w and ∆ will have an odd relationship on dichotomous cue values. If ∆ is less than
the discrete step size for a cue, the value of this parameter cannot influence search.
On the other hand, if ∆ is larger than this step size, then the model will always
search the next cue. For these dichotomous cues, the only important question about
∆ for a given cue is whether it is less than one or not. If ∆1 is less than one, the
model will only search past the first cue when it does not discriminate between the
alternatives. If ∆1 is greater than or equal to one, the model will never stop at the
first cue. Since the decision mechanism is non-compensatory and only focuses on a
single cue at a time, the latter case means that the first cue would not influence the
decision process. This same reasoning applies to cues in any position and potentially
limits the application of ∆I to dichotomous-cue environments. The hierarchical
Bayesian models used in this chapter allow distributions on parameter values and
∆ is continuously-valued with probability density both above and below zero. The
observed values of ∆ turn stopping into a stochastic process, the ∆I model will only
stop at a discriminating with a probability that the applicable ∆ parameter is less
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than one. Stochastic stopping effectively adds another source of variability into the
model, though the addition appears to cause almost no change in search order.
The GCT is one environment where working memory constraints might have
played a role. Conditional selection can cause problems for later cues. For example,
the ninth cue in the cities environment is whether or not a given city was in East
Germany. Cities in East Germany tend to have larger populations than those that
weer in West Germany. This is not necessarily the case when the prior either
cues have already been searched. Given that the previous eight cues are all tied,
cue nine might even have a negative cue validity. This would cause the model
to make the incorrect choice once it has search to the ninth discriminating cue.
Earlier work has explored the application of greedy algorithms that account for this
conditional dependency with TTB, but find that decisions based on this strategy
are worse in cross-validation than unconditioned decision rules, though this is not
compared to any decision models that explicitly cease search after a set number
of cues (Martignon and Hoffrage, 2002). In the case of truncated search as in the
original implementation of HyGene, a limited working memory would cause the
model to exit search and guess after searching a set number of cues. If conditional
cue validity is negative for later cues, ignoring those later cues potentially leads




This chapter uses Search, ∆I, and HyGene to explore an ecology with dichoto-
mous cue values and with a strong relationship between the cues and the outcome.
The findings for Search replicate Lee and Newell (2011) and provide additional evi-
dence for the flexibility that ∆I and HyGene’s specific parameters provide in search
order.
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Chapter 5: Modeling human inference: A novel behavioral experi-
ment
This chapter focuses on the application of Search, ∆I, and HyGene to data
from participants in a behavioral task. After unique training periods on a novel
task environment, participants are allowed information on a single cue and asked to
choose between a pair of stimuli. Data from this experiment allow for comparison
of the three models in an environment that potentially requires the full flexibility
of HyGene. Given the inconsistency in search orders observed in previous studies,
I expect the inconsistent individual search orders allowed under HyGene give this
more complicated model an advantage relative to Search and ∆I. I also expect ∆I to
guess slightly more often than Search, assuming some probability of ∆1 exceeding
the difference in cue values for the first cue.
The current data also give a second, convergent method for validating the
models. While participant judgments and cue values will be used to fit each model,
participants also generate information on which cue is searched first for each trial.
Existence of cue choices allow for comparison observed cue search and predicted
cue search from each model. Potential inconsistency in the first cue searched for
each participant which favors the assumptions built into HyGene, which allows for
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varying search order based on the probe vector. Search and ∆I should both produce




Thirty-eight participants (60% female) from the Psychology department sub-
ject pool at the University of Maryland, College Park took part in this experiment.
Participants received partial course credit for their participation.
Stimuli
Stimuli for this experiment consisted of line drawings of ponies that were
identical except for four dichotomous cues: nose color, leg stripes, hind spots, and
tail color. All combinations of four dichotomous cues yields a total of 16 unique
figures, see Figure 5.1 for maximally different examples.
The ecology in this experiment was designed so that CV, DR, and τ/success
would each identify a separate, preferred cue1. The ecology consists of one set of
cue weights and some probability for each unique pony. Stimulus pairs for both
learning and test phases were created by uniformly sampling from figures according
to the frequencies listed in Table 5.1. This sampling process produces an ecology
1Due to a coding error, a second ecology did not accurately allow discrimination between success
and τ and is not reported.
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(a) All cues absent. (b) All cues present.
Figure 5.1: Comparison of pony drawings use in learning phase.


















Table 5.1: Frequencies of each stimulus for the test ecology.
Procedure
Participants gave consent and heard the following description:
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Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4
CV 0.704 0.871 0.867 0.997
DR 0.502 0.427 0.276 0.232
τa 0.205 0.317 0.202 0.231
τb 0.319 0.518 0.405 0.525
Success 0.603 0.659 0.601 0.615
p(Present) 0.495 0.345 0.185 0.135
Weight 0.100 0.200 0.200 0.400
Table 5.2: Summary statistics for pony cue ecology.
Welcome to the world of pony consulting. This is a cut-throat industry
in which desirable ponies are in high demand, pony buyers are extremely
wealthy, and pony sellers are highly protective of their goods.
You are training to become a pony consultant. As a pony consultant,
your task is to pick ponies that your clients will like. As with any other
competitive consulting industry, you will get [rewarded/penalized] for
[satisfied/dissatisfied] clients for whom you select the [right/wrong] pony.
Your payment today will be based on your overall performance - your
goal is to [earn the most positive/receive the fewest negative] reviews.
To prepare for pony consultant work, you will first practice selecting
ponies. You will see pictures on the screen of two different ponies and
you must choose the more desirable pony. Ponies vary on four traits:
face color, leg stripes, spots, and tail color. Pay attention because once
you start working you will need to know which pony traits are considered
most desirable so you pick the right ponies for your clients.
After completing training, work in the real industry begins at the pony
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auction house. As before, you must select the more desirable pony.
However, in the real world where the pony sellers are highly protective
of the ponies, you must pay to reveal traits. As a junior consultant,
you have only enough budget to reveal one trait for each pair of ponies.
After that trait is revealed, you must make your choice.
Now it’s time to practice selecting ponies. On the screen you will see
pairs of ponies. Use the mouse to indicate which pony is more desirable.
After making your choice you will receive feedback - green means you
made the correct choice; red means you made the incorrect choice; and
yellow means that the ponies were equally desirable.
Participants then completed 40 learning trials. On each learning trial, par-
ticipants saw two ponies side-by-side and clicked a button under the picture they
judged to have higher value based on the set of cues. Following each choice, the but-
tons disappeared from the screen and a colored border appeared around the selected
picture: green for correct, yellow for tied, and red for incorrect. For correct and tied
choices, the border remained for 500 ms, while the incorrect border remained for
2000 ms.
After 40 trials, a research assistant read the following instructions to partici-
pants:
Congratulations! You’re now a junior consultant. As before, you will see
pairs of ponies but this time, their traits are covered. You have enough
budget to reveal one trait for each pair of ponies; it is not necessary
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to pick the same trait every time. Once the trait is revealed, you must
select the more desirable pony.
Every time you select a pony that your client really [likes/dislikes], you
will receive a [positive/negative] performance review. At the end of the
pony auction, the number of [positive/negative] reviews will determine
your pay - the [more positive/fewer negative] reviews you earned, the
more sweets you get.
Participants then completed 160 test trials. Each test trial began with two
masked stimuli (Figure 5.2). Participants were allowed to select a single cue to
uncover by clicking on the corresponding named button, which removed the cover
from only that cue. They then made their choice between the stimuli based on that
single cue. After each decision, a tally of the earned points at the bottom of the
screen updated.
(a) All cues masked. (b) One cue masked.
Figure 5.2: Stimulus states for test phase.
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Modeling
Models are fit only to the 38 participants in the first ecology. HyGene, Search,
and ∆I required slight modification to accommodate heterogeneous training samples.
An implicit assumption with previous datasets is that participants have experience
with the ecologies of interest. This assumption is instantiated by fitting the models
using CV and DR calculated on the entire ecology (Search and ∆I) and including an
episodic memory weights for all pairwise comparisons between objects in the ecology
(HyGene). For this set of simulations, model CV and DR are calculated separately
for each participant using only the 40 pairs of stimuli seen during training. The
episodic memory for HyGene is also limited to this set of training stimuli. Partic-
ipants saw limited feedback during test and cannot be expected to have previous
experience with the artificial test environment created for this study. Failure to ac-
count for the different experiences participants had with the environment potentially
biases the subject-varying parameters fit to test responses.
The current experiment allowed participants to search only a single cue before
making a decision. The models are also modified to make a choice after inspecting
only a single cue despite determining a search order for the entire cue population.
5.2 Results
Participants’ accuracy improved over the course of training in spite of the short
duration. Table 5.3 and Figure 5.3 show that on average, accuracy increases from













Figure 5.3: Jittered scatterplot and logistic regression prediction for accuracy by
trial during training. The intermediate tick marks on the y-axis show the aver-
age predicted accuracy for the first and last trials based on the multilevel logistic
regression model in Table 5.3.
overall ease of the task; the outcome is perfectly predicted from the cues assuming
full knowledge of the environment. All of the cues are also positively related to
value and participants have access to all cues during training. Given a dearth of
plausible alternatives, these results suggest that participants are increasing accuracy
on average by learning about the cue ecology.
Fixed Effects
Coefficient Std. Error z Pr(> |z|)
Intercept 1.07 0.185 5.793 6.93× 10−9
Trial 0.023 0.009 2.451 0.014
Varying Effects
Group Coefficient Variance Std. Dev.
Subject Intercept 0.554 0.744
Trial 0.001 0.038
Table 5.3: Summary of multilevel logistic regression predicting accuracy using trial
and varying both intercept and the effect of trial by participant.
One important feature of these data is the variation in search orders within
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participants (Figure 5.4). Ideally, a model of decision making would both predict
participant choices and mimic the decision process used by participants. Search and
∆I are specified with the assumption that participants use a consistent search order
for each participant, a feature that is contradicted by the search patterns in these
data. If HyGene is emulating the process of memory search participants are using
to make decisions, then the model should both fit the choices participants made and











Figure 5.4: Distributions of first cue searched during the test phase for three example
participants.
Model
Metric HyGene Search ∆I
log L −4215 −4215 −4215
Penalty 0.004 0.003 0.005
DIC 8431 8431 8431




µβ 0.027, 0.06, 0.09, 0.081





µ∆ 0.515, 0.529, 0.502, 0.497
σ∆ 0.747, 0.831, 0.864, 0.699
µw 0.516
σw 0.711
Table 5.5: Median fixed effects for all models fit empirical data. γ is the probability
of choosing consistent with the terminating model prediction (i.e., not failing to
apply the model), µw is the average relative weight of CV and DR, and σw is the
standard deviation of relative weight parameters. µ∆ and σ∆ give the mean and
standard deviation of the delta parameters for each cue, indicating the distribution of
differences in cue values needed to terminate search. µβ and σβ give the distributions
for the weights in HyGene, indicating average search order.
Table 5.4 gives the log likelihood, penalty, and DIC for each of the three models
on these data. These data are equally likely under each of the three models. The
additional parameters in ∆I and HyGene have almost no effect in this circumstance,
so the penalty used for DIC is nearly equivalent for all three models as well. For all
three models, γ is exactly .5 (Table 5.2). While the β parameters for HyGene are
defined relative to the training data and are unaffected by this, the fixed effects for
Search and ∆I reflected the prior distributions because they have no effect on the
likelihood calculation when γ = .5.
Other evidence suggests that participants are not guessing (Figure A.1). To get
an idea of how the models would fit on the assumption that people were not always
guessing at the outcome, each model was fit to the data with the γ parameter fixed
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Model
Metric HyGene Search ∆I
log L −5406 −5406 −5396
Penalty 0 0 24.46
DIC 1.081× 104 1.081× 104 1.082× 104
Table 5.6: Model comparisons for HyGene, Search, and ∆I on the empirical data
with fixed γ = .75.
Model Parameter Value
HyGene µβ 0.027, 0.06, 0.09, 0.081
σβ 0.114, 0.11, 0.11, 0.095
Search µw 0.515
σw 0.729
∆I µ∆ 0.505, 0.506, 0.505, 0.504
σ∆ 0.385, 0.432, 0.374, 0.448
µw 0.454
σw 0.684
Table 5.7: Median fixed effects for all models fit to empirical data with fixed
γ = 0.75. µw is the average relative weight of CV and DR, and σw is the standard
deviation of relative weight parameters. µ∆ and σ∆ give the mean and standard
deviation of the delta parameters for each cue, indicating the distribution of differ-
ences in cue values needed to terminate search. µβ and σβ give the distributions for
the weights in HyGene, indicating average search order.
at .75. The results are in Tables 5.6 and 5.2. These models all have lower average
likelihoods after the forced increase for γ. While ∆I has a slight advantage relative
to Search and HyGene in likelihood, it also has a much larger effective number of
parameters, giving it larger (and less favorable) DIC.
Figure 5.5 plots the probability of choosing each cue first for each participant
for each of the models and the empirical data based on the search orders from
the revised models that fix γ at .75. The task only allowed participants to search
a single cue, so validation must be limited to predictions regarding the first cue

























































































Cue 1 2 3 4
Figure 5.5: Probability of choosing each of the four cues first by source, faceted by
participant (with the right bar showing empirical cue choice distributions). Two
subjects omitted for space.
the data. Almost all participants searched all of the cues first at least once. Some
participants had near-uniform rates of first cue search while others were much more
likely to choose one or two cues more often than the others. The preferred cue
differed by participant; some of the non-uniform choosers preferred cue four (highest
CV) while others preferred cue one (highest DR). The three models are also fit to
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the same training information as the participants, so a really successful model would
exhibit all of these patterns and also accurately predict the frequencies with which
each participant chose to search cues first. Prediction of cue search behavior is a
particularly high bar, given that the model likelihood does not depend on these
search orders; first cue search is an emergent property for all three models.
Search and ∆I both make very similar predictions for first cue searched. Both
of these models predict that cues one and four will be searched with some probabil-
ity for most participants, with occasional looks at cue three. Both models also show
some variability is uniformity of cue choice: some participants show a strong pref-
erence for a single cue while others choose between three of the available cues more
evenly. The variance in uniformity does not follow observed patterns in participant
cue choice, however; Search and ∆I do not follow a given participants probabilities
of choosing individual cues very closely, if at all. Neither of these models predicts
even a single look at the second cue, a notable departure from the data.
HyGene makes very different predictions that are inaccurate in different ways.
This model usually only identifies a single cue that a participant will search, though
it occasionally shows a second cue with a non-zero probability of being searched
first. HyGene does sometimes predict the second cue as being the preferred cue,
though, which is consistent with the observed choices and never predicted by Search
or ∆I. The modal pick for HyGene is also reasonably consistent with the modal
choice for each participant.
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5.3 Discussion
The current chapter focuses on fitting Search, ∆I, and HyGene to human
responses rather than generated data. While simulated data was useful in under-
standing the mechanics for each model, the goal is to understand something about
human behavior. I focus on each model in turn before attempting to reconcile the
inferences from the differing explanations.
For these experimental data, HyGene predicts very consistent search orders
within participant. HyGene also predicts that no one will search the DR cue. Despite
obvious deviations from the observed data, the single cue searched by HyGene often
agrees with the first- or second-most searched cue in reality. Though HyGene’s
search orders are too consistent, the pattern of cue choices suggests that the ordering
mechanism is picking up on the same environmental structure as the participants.
HyGene’s median values of µβ are quite small compared with σβ. Despite this,
HyGene searches cues in a very consistent order. This suggests unmodeled but
positive covariances between β parameters, which encode the overlap between the
cues in predicting magnitude of interest. Especially on the small training samples
in this experiment, collinearity between βs may be reflected in cue search.
Search heavily favors initial search of the first (DR) and fourth (CV) cues.
Search also occasionally searches the third cue, which is preferred by no suggested
cue ordering metric, but avoids the τ/success cue. This behavior is the result of a
large uncertainty on the relative weighting of CV and DR described by σw. Search
was formulated as a model about the individual differences in cue search based on
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fixed, point values of w for each participant. Despite this, the variability w within
participant is what allows variation in cue search order and increases similarity
between modeled and actual cue search orders. Search is interesting because of the
extremism it shows. The model probabilistically searches the CV cue, which has
very poor discrimination, or the DR cue, which has the poorest CV, despite the
existence of cue two, which goes entirely unsearched and is a compromise between
these features.
Delta Inference makes predictions that are largely consistent with the Search
model. The ∆ parameter distributions once again have density above one, so some
of the time a differentiating cue is being ignored. Large values are ∆ are infrequent,
however, and do very little to change search order. The relative weighting param-
eters are very similar to those in the Search model and yield very similar first-cue
choices.
Across all three models, participants are guessing quite often. The high rate
of guessing is likely a function of the ecology, which contains a large number of tied
values and no cues of exactly zero weight. Assuming the correct valence is learned
for each cue, searching any cue will yield above-chance accuracy. Participants may
have picked up on this strategy and been insufficiently motivated to maximize ac-
curacy on the task by using a more difficult strategy. This would be consistent
with findings from Newell et al. (2009), which also used an environment for which
different strategies would yield only small differences in accuracy.
The current experimental setup may not be an ideal test for these models. All
four cues have positive predictive value according to the CV, DR, and success. If the
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cues are too similar, participants may be unwilling or unable to distinguish between
them. The difference in accuracy between conditions provides some protection from
this criticism. The only difference in information for a given trial, and the only
way accuracy could differ, is through cue choices. Despite the variation in first cues
chosen, the difference in accuracy between conditions provides indirect evidence for
some consistent pattern in cue use. Another potentially limiting factor is the single
cue that participants are allowed during the test phase. Forcing a single cue choice
could change cue ordering behavior. While there is no way of knowing whether
limiting available information alters cue utilization, this is a potentially interesting
question for future research. If limiting information changes decision making, then
it may be an important feature to include in future decision models. While no a
priori reason exists for limiting information to alter cue use, it could explain the
failure of all three models to capture cue choices in this study.
5.3.1 Summary
Beyond a high proportion of guessing, these three models do not agree on much
regarding participant behavior. No single model is a particularly good predictor of
actual participant search orders despite having nearly equivalent likelihoods for these
data. This is partially by design, each of these models exists to explain decision
making at a different level. In this case, however, it produces models that are
mutually incompatible while capturing qualitatively different features in cue search.
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Chapter 6: General Discussion
The road to wisdom? — Well, it’s plain








Search, ∆ Inference, and HyGene have disparate theoretical motivation but
predict human behavior with similar success. Being simplifications, it is neither
surprising nor discouraging that they also fail to account for potentially important
response patterns (Box and Draper, 1987). These limitations do not preclude the
culling of useful information from computational models, however; the ways in which
these models fail tells us something about what aspects of decision making could be
explained by omitted components.
Chapter two summarizes the performance of Search, ∆I, and HyGene when fit
to data generated from each of the three models using two well-defined, underlying
ecologies. ∆I consistently outperforms Search and HyGene both in penalized and
unpenalized likelihood despite a large effective number of parameters. Searching
past a continuous cue that barely discriminates between alternatives is potentially
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more important for model performance than flexible order of search. Both Search
and ∆I had fixed search orders for these data. Given the focus on psychology rather
than normative model performance, these results serve merely as a baseline for
understanding how different aspects of these models are related.
Each model is next fit to simulated participants with varying search order
governed by a weighted combination of CV and DR. The GCT is a commonly-used
dataset for decision research with unknown but naturalistic ecological structure and
strong relationships between the cues and criterion values. For these data, Search
fit better than ∆I and HyGene, though all three models identify very similar distri-
butions of search orders, albeit with varying precision and accuracy. While this still
tells us nothing about the psychology of decision making as such, it suggests limita-
tions with using ∆I on dichotomous cues and shows that, even with mis-specification,
HyGene’s ordering mechanism generates reasonable posterior distributions of cue
search behavior.
The penultimate chapter compares Search, ∆I, and HyGene when fit to be-
havioral data using an ecology designed to assess cue preference. The models in
this chapter suggest, above all else, that participants in this study were guessing
a large percentage of the time despite statistical evidence of greater-than-chance
accuracy. The three models produce highly similar average fit statistics, suggesting
comparable success in explaining the data. HyGene also produces very different
search behavior than Search and ∆I when focusing only on the first cue searched.
Search and ∆I settle on values of w that vary the first cue searched between the first
and fourth cue (those highest on DR and CV, respectively) with occasional looks
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at the third cue (highest on none of the included metrics) depending on the partic-
ipant. HyGene produces search behavior that is very consistent within participant,
but would have participants search the second, third, or fourth cue depending on
their training set. These different behaviors are uniquely inconsistent with observed
search behavior; both should select among all four cues, though they omit different
cues, and both should show more variability among cues within participant, though
HyGene shows less variability than Search and ∆I.
Search, ∆I, and HyGene exhibit some consistency in the posterior estimates of
their parameters. The guessing parameter, γ, is estimated quite consistently across
all models when fit to the same data. Consistency in γ suggests that the models
agree on the error rate with which participants apply TTB to the modeled search
orders. Though ∆I tends to converge on a slightly higher mean value, this is caused
by an increased number of guesses. In terms of the model, when TTB(aj, bj) /∈ (a, b),
the model chooses either outcome with a 50% chance. ∆I has a higher proportional
of true guesses because of the possibility of ∆ > 1; true guesses do not affect the
posterior of γ. Error of application and guessing are only equivalent when γ = .5,
otherwise the model is more likely to produce a correctly-applied response.
In the GCT with participants simulated from Lee and Newell (2011), all three
models identify very similar search orders. Despite the true search order being
dictated by a relative weighting of CV and DR, the HyGene cue ordering mechanic
approximates the search orders quite well. HyGene has more diffuse distributions
of τ order due to misspecification, but still manages to find some search orders that
are closer to the true order compared with Search and ∆I due to the varying search
72
order within participant. The observed consistency in search order suggests that
whatever variance in cue ordering is due to CV and DR can be at least partially
recovered using the current version of HyGene’s search of episodic memory.
Taken together, this agreement causes problems for the interpretation of the
models in chapter four. For these data, HyGene’s predicted search orders are quite
different from Search and ∆I when fixing γ above the guessing threshold. The
initial, low value for γ, however, suggests that regardless of the searched cue, the
models predict that participants are effectively guessing. This consistent inference
across the models, despite performance well above chance for nearly all participants,
indicates that some important aspect of decision making behavior is entirely ignored
by these models.
6.1 Psychological Plausibility
Like all research, these studies have limitations. The three tested models
represent a very small subset of the possible models that encode cue ordering in a
two-alternative, forced-choice context. Other models like SSL (Rieskamp and Otto,
2006), mixtures of models (Scheibehenne et al., 2013), or cognitive neuroscience-
inspired models (Donoso et al., 2014), could more closely resemble the decision
process that people use. Search, ∆I, and HyGene are interesting particularly because
of their similarity. While these studies are unlikely to uncover the true generating
model for participants’ responses, features of the process that are consistent with
available explanations are more likely to be true of human decision making.
Further work in decision making must focus on psychological plausibility.
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Though hierarchical Bayesian modeling of individual differences is a step beyond
deterministic models, aspects of Search, ∆I, and HyGene are still potentially opti-
mistic about the limits of human cognition. Search and ∆I, for instance, make use
of CV and DR calculations, which require that people either store or calculate those
for relevant cues when making a decision. Calculation of CV and DR is less psycho-
logically plausible than something like HyGene, which is based directly on memory
search and therefore has convergent evidence for the cue ordering mechanism. One
could go farther by including limitations on working memory, including temporal
dynamics, or modeling the learning process within these models.
These models could be further constrained. For example, psychological con-
structs like working memory could be assessed and included as data in these models
(Lee, 2010), rather than assumed and fit as free parameters. Adding features such
as working memory to all of these models potentially increases the psychological
and biological plausibility of these models.
6.2 Modeling Search Order
The CV and DR weighting mechanism in the Search model is restrictive. The
Search method of weighting only allows search orders that are some combination
of CV and DR. The data from Chapter 4 serve as an existence proof that, at least
some of the time, participants will select cues that are not ever predicted by this
metric. While there are mathematical and historical reasons for focusing on CV
and DR, a model allowing all possible search orders would sacrifice some ease of
interpretation for a more accurate estimate of variance in search order attributable
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to individual differences. The w parameter is convenient, it is interpreted as a
participants’ relative preference for two cue metrics. A Dirichlet distribution or
Gaussian process model for search order would allow for all possible search orders
but would be nearly impossible to summarize with a single value. If the goal for
the Search model is to give plausible estimates of sources of uncertainty in decision
processes, then abandoning w for a more flexible mechanism makes sense.
Another problem with the use of w to establish cue order is that it maps
non-linearly onto search order. Depending on the distribution of CV and DR in a
given ecology, changes in w cause completely unpredictable changes in search order.
The non-linear mapping of w onto cue order gives little reason to believe that the
posterior distribution on w will be continuous and unimodal, either. Despite the
apparently simple interpretation and obvious relationship with the success metric,
relative weighting of CV and DR is a troublesome method for understanding search
order.
6.3 Contamination
Lee (2010) also suggests a process for detecting contamination. Though the
first two chapters focused on simulated data, chapter four’s empirical data almost
certainly includes features that are not the direct and sole result of a person making
his or her best judgments about the task. The models in this dissertation include a
misapplication parameter, γ, which fills this role in a limited way. Lee and Newell
(2011) interpret this term as an error of application, with γ being the probability
of choosing explicitly counter to the TTB prediction (and separate from guessing).
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Modeling contamination might make use of additional information, such as reaction
time or changes in accuracy over time, to isolate and remove patterns in data that
are unrelated to the underlying construct of interest. Removing contaminants pre-
vents the substantive model parameters from attempting to account for variability
in the observed data that are actually the result of a mixture process. In addition
to guessing, participants may also search cues differently over time (Table A.2), a
process that could be motivated by the limited feedback, boredom, or exhaustion.
The motivation for removing contaminants is the same as for removing outlying
data points. Extreme scores can bias statistical tests. Unfortunately, unprincipled
outlier removal can also negatively influence test properties (Antonakis and Dietz,
2011). Removing participants with near-chance accuracy would partially alleviate
the problem of modeling the mixture of true decision making behavior and contam-
inant guessing, but it would also introduce a selection problem into the modeling.
Modeling contaminant processes provides a principled method of removing spurious
or unrelated patterns in the data. One inference from chapter four is that partici-
pants are almost certainly guessing on some trials. Different collection methods and
more constrained models would potentially allow us to isolate the guessed trials by
participant and focus on trials that are the result of a legitimate decision process.
6.4 Aggregation
Search order is not the only question and might not even be a relevant question.
Thought the models under consideration assume sequential cue search, people may
combine cues in various, unordered ways to produce decisions. Some modeling has
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even been done to capture the trade-off between sequential and simultaneous cue
use (Lee and Newell, 2011; Ravenzwaaij et al., 2014). In some cases, both methods
produce similar results. Many studies provide evidence that participants search
through cues rather than combining them in some way (Newell and Shanks, 2003).
The experimental data in chapter four allows only a single cue’s information for
each decision at test. Even if this scenario is only relevant to a subset of decisions
that people make in the wider world, participants in the study had to choose among
cues in some way.
A more extensive comparison of the Search, ∆I, and HyGene models would
explore aggregation as well. The Stop model, briefly discussed in chapter 1, provides
one potential method for understanding the balance between effort and information
in decision processes Lee and Newell (2011). The same methods used for cue ordering
could be applied as weighting schemes or to alter the stopping rules used for the
decision process.
One motivation for exploring non-normative models of decision making is to
account for the information-processing constraints that humans impose on the pro-
cess. Decision processes could be made informationally frugal in a large number of
ways. This is a question that ∆I attempts to address. With dichotomous cues, the
∆ parameters in our models were just another source of uncertainty in the models,
occasionally allowing the search process to continue past a dichotomous cue. With
continuously-valued cues, however, ∆ provides a mechanism for adaptive equiva-
lence, setting a threshold on what differences are meaningful enough to stop search.
Though this level of complication was not justified in the limited environments for
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the present dissertation, fitting to multiple environments and examining sources of
individual variation or combining the ∆ parameterization with other cue ordering
methods could be useful.
6.5 Summary
People make seemingly difficult decisions constantly and with relative ease.
Experimental work shows that these decisions do not conform to a variety prescrip-
tive or deterministic models, but it is yet unclear how far uncertainty can be reduced
in human decision processes. This dissertation shows that three qualitatively differ-
ent computational models of cue ordering and decision making can fit empirical data
with similar success but fail to capture important patterns in search order. Assum-
ing sequential search of cue information, people might differ on relative weighting of
cue metrics or generate cue orders based on similarity of a decision to memories of
the ecology. Either way, other inputs to the decision process must explain variation
in individual cue ordering and people probably aggregate over multiple cues in some
instances.
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Appendix A: Experimental Differences in Accuracy
Fixed Effects
Coefficient Std. Error z Pr(> |z|)
Intercept 0.314 0.072 4.334 1.46× 10−5
Gain 0.228 0.103 2.223 0.026
Error Terms
Group Coefficient Std. Dev.
Subject Intercept 0.259
Residual 1.000
Table A.1: Summary of multilevel logistic regression predicting accuracy using con-
dition and varying intercept by participant. Intercept gives the average accuracy
for the loss condition, the difference in accuracy for the gain condition is given by
the Gain predictor.
There is some evidence that the gain/loss manipulation alters accuracy. Par-
ticipants were generally not very accurate on the task, with an overall accuracy of
59.8% ± 0.5%. A multilevel logistic regression with varying intercepts by participant
suggests that accuracy is higher for participants in the gain condition compared to
those in the loss condition (Table A.1). Very few participants had average accuracies
of less than chance (Figure A.1).
It is possible that, absent sufficient engagement or feedback, participants al-
tered their cue search strategies over time. Table A.2 presents posterior estimates
for a multilevel multinomial model predicting participant cue choices in the test
phase by trial using a logistic link function with MCMCglmm (Hadfield, 2010).
















Figure A.1: Boxplots for average participant accuracy by condition.
on cue choice for each participant, which is the equivalent of varying intercepts and
slopes in a multilevel regression. The first three parameters estimate the rates of
choosing cues two, three, and four relative to cue one on the first trial. Participants
appear to choose cues one and three at nearly equal rates for the first trial, while
cues two and four are chosen less often than the first cue. The second three param-
eters estimate the difference in rate of choosing between a given cue and cue one
for each additional trial. Relative to cue one, cue two is chosen more often in later
trials. Figure A.2 shows the probability of choosing each cue over time, averaged
over participants.
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Parameter Mean 95% CI pMCMC
Cue 2 −0.41 (−0.7, −0.07) 0.013
Cue 3 −0.22 (−0.6, 0.2) 0.269
Cue 4 −0.48 (−0.9, −0.07) 0.025
Cue 2:Trial 0.002 (−4× 10−6, 0.004) 0.042
Cue 3:Trial 10−5 (−0.002, 0.002) 0.967
Cue 4:Trial 6.6× 10−4 (−0.002, 0.003) 0.697
Table A.2: Fixed effect estimates for a multilevel multinomial model predicting
cue choice by time with varying effects by participant. Mean gives the mean of the
marginal posterior distribution for each parameter, while the 95% confidence interval
gives the 2.5% and 97.5% percentile samples for each marginal posterior distribution.
pMCMC is an MCMC approximate of the p-value and gives the probability of
observed an estimate of equal or greater magnitude given the estimated standard




































Figure A.2: Probability of choosing each cue, averaged over subjects, over the
course of the test trials. Error ribbon represents a single proportion standard error,√
p · (1− p)/N
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